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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
courts are especially appropriate, and its elimination would have no sig-
nificant impact on the workload of the federal courts.7"
Finally, the rule suggested offers an opportunity to settle this area
of conflict quickly and with certainty. As Justice Brandeis once re-
marked, "in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule
be settled than that it be settled [correctly] .... "71 The Supreme Court
should take advantage of one of the opportunities certain to arise to
establish a definite rule. And if it fails to do so, Congress should.
R. B. TuCKER, JR.
Municipal Corporations-Public Purpose-Taxation and Revenue
Bonds to Finance Low-Income Housing
In Martin v. North Carolina Housing Corp.' the North Carolina
Supreme Court upheld the statute establishing the Housing Corporation
as a "public agency... empowered to act on behalf of the State... for
the purpose of providing residential housing 'for sale or rental to persons
and families of lower income.' "2 In so holding, the court resolved in favor
of the Housing Corporation challenges regarding public purpose, lending
of credit, creation of debt, delegation of legislative authority, and property
tax exemption, arising under various sections of the North Carolina
Constitution.'
The dissent singled out the noteworthy holdings of the case: public pur-
pose and tax exemption. In the latter regard the court in Martin upheld the
statutory tax exemption of the bonds to be issued by the Housing Corpo-
70Id.
n Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas, 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932).
1277 N.C. 29, 175 S.E.2d 665 (1970).2Id. at 34, 175 S.E2d at 667. The Housing Corporation was to issue self-
liquidating, tax-exempt revenue bonds and use the proceeds to purchase federally
insured mortgage and construction loans. The Housing Corporation would also
establish a housing development fund with grants and loans from industry, foun-
dations, and government to be used for project development loans, downpayment
assistance to needy families, and uninsured loans to builders and developers for
land development and residential construction. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 122A-1 to -23
(Supp. 1969).
'N.C. CoNsT. art. V, § 3, limiting the power of taxation to public purposes; art.
VII, § 6, limiting the power of a municipal corporation to pledge its faith; art. V.
§ 4, limiting the power of the General Assembly to lend the credit of the State; art.
I, § 8, defining the separation of the powers of government; and, art. V, § 5,
defining the scope of the exemption of property from taxation.
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ration. Article V, section 5 of the North Carolina Constitution provides
that "[p] roperty belonging to the State, counties and municipal corpora-
tions shall be exempt from taxation," and that the General Assembly may
exempt certain enumerated properties, but does not include in the list
bonds issued by the state or an agency of the state. The majority, in
finding the exemption permissible,4 simply reaffirmed State Education
Assistance Authority v. Bank of States'aille,5 in which the court had held
that the General Assembly could exempt revenue bonds from -taxation by
the state and its subdivisions "[s]ince the tax-exempt feature makes
possible a more favorable sale of revenue bonds and thereby contributes
substantially to the accomplishment of the public purpose for which they
are issued."
The dissent noted that the court previously had upheld the exemption
of state, county, and municipal bonds on the rationale that the exemption
would reduce the interest that the issuer would have to pay on the bonds
and thus achieve approximately the same effect as if the bonds were taxed
and the 'higher interest paid. Since these were revenue bonds and not
obligations of the state, the dissent argued that such reasoning did not
apply in this case.6 However, as in previous cases, 7 the promotion of the
public purpose of the organization issuing the bonds was a dispositive
factor. The court in Martin thus reinforces the exemption of bonds issued
by state agencies not merely where the savings in interest will accrue
directly to the state, but also where it serves to advance the public purpose
of the particular program.
On the issue of public purpose, the court took notice of the legis-
lative findings of a shortage of decent, safe, and sanitary housing for
low-income families, and the inability of the private sector to meet the
need ;8 it further noted the authority of the General Assembly to legislate
for "the protection of the public health, safety, morals and general welfare
of the people."" By having more decent housing, the court reasoned,
families and persons of low income, who might not otherwise obtain such
accommodations, would acquire a stake in the preservation of society and
' 277 N.C. at 57-58, 175 S.E.2d at 681-82.276 N.C. 576, 589, 174 S.E.2d 551, 560 (1970).
0 277 N.C. at 65, 175 S.E.2d at 686. See also Pullen v. Corporation Comm'n,
152 N.C. 548, 565, 68 S.E. 155, 163 (1910) (dissenting opinion).
' State Educ. Assistance Auth. v. Bank of Statesville, 276 N.C. 576, 589, 174
S.E.2d 551, 560 (1970); Webb v. Port Comm'n of Morehead City, 205 N.C. 663,
674-75, 172 S.E. 377, 383 (1934).
8277 N.C. at 49, 175 S.E.2d at 676.0Id. at 45, 175 S.E.2d at 674.
1971]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
institutional stability. On this basis the activities of the Housing Corpora-
tion were found to be for a public purpose.10
Implicit in the "spirit of American Constitutions" is the idea that the
government shall always confine itself to the proper business or function
of governiment." Thus, in finding the activities of the Housing Corpora-
tion to be within the ambit of public purpose, the court considered them
to embody a proper object of government. 12 This 'general limit on the
activities of government is defined by the scope of the three major forms of
governmental power: the power to tax for public purposes;13 specifically
limited in the North Carolina Constitution ;' the power of eminent domain
for public uses ;15 and the police power for promoting the public health,
safety, morals, and general welfare. 6 The definition of the pi'oper func-
tion of government, i dependent also upon changing times and con-
ditions.17 Since the three powers all'relate to the proper conduct of the
business of government, and are so interrelated, an evaluation of the realm
of public purpose requires an examination of the definition of govern-
inent~l function in all three areas.
T pes of activities which at some time had been held by the North
Carolina courts to embrace-a public purpose were listed by one writer in
1947 to include the'following: "aid to railroads, aid to establish a teachers
training school, railway terminal facilities, public auditorium, World War
I Veteran's Loan Fund, the state fair, a park, a municipal hospital, an
airport, port terminal facilities, public housing authority under federal
housing acts, playgrounds and recreational facilities, public libraries, and
schools."' 8 Subsequently the North Carolina Supreme Court has ruled
within the ambit of public purpose the expenditure of tax revenues by a
municipality for a policeman to attend a training course,'9 a voter-approved
sale bf munikipal bonds for the donstruction of an armory outside the
110 Id. at 49-50, 175 S.E.2d at 677.
" 38 Am. Jun. Municipal Corporations § 395 (1941).
" The North Carolina Supreme Court has held a tax to be for a public purpose
if it is f9r the support of a recognized object of government. Green v. Kitchin,
229 N.C. 450, 455, 50 S.E.2d 545, 549 (1948).
1851 Am. JuR. Taxation §§ 6, 321, 326 (1944).1
'N.C. CoNsT. art. V, § 3.
26 Am. JuR. 2d Eminent Domain § 25 (1966).
10 Siate v. Brown, 250 N.C. 54, 56, 108 S.E.2d 74, 76 (1959).
'Fawcett v. Town of Mt. Airy, 134 N.C. 125, 45 S.E. 1029 (1903). See also
Albritton v. City of Winona,, 181 Miss. 75, 178 So. 799, appeal dismissed, 303 U.S.
627 (.1938).
" Note, Municipal Corporations-Taxation--Meaning of Public Purpose, 25
N.C.L. REv. 504, 506 (1947) (numbering omitted).
19 Green v. Kitchin, 229 N.C. 450, 50 S.E.2d 545 (1948).
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corporate limits,2 0 municipal revenue bonds for the purchase of a lake and
a generating plant,21 atd a 9tate revenue-bond, issue for loans to residents
of slender means to facilitate their post-sec6ndafy education.
22
However; the court has declined to include within the scope of public
purpose activities less directly related to the function of government or
representing a greater intrusi6n into the private sector. In Nash v. Tozwz
of Tarboro2 the court rejected the levy of'tax and issue of bonds for the
construction of a hotel, feeling that such public benefits as might accrue
Would be "too incidental to jtistif the expendifuie of ptiblic ftinds." An
appropriation of municipal tax revenues to a Chaniber of Commerde to be
spent at its discretion to encourage industrial plants to locate near the city
was struck down by the court in 1923 on the ground'that the members of
the Chamber of Commerce exercise no governmetal duty.14 Nearly forty
years later the court found a sufficient public purpose in- a municipal
appropriation to the Chamber of Commerce to advertise advantages of the
city.2 5 However, the court limited its approval to the use of nontax
revenues and took emphatic note of the provisions for an advance budget
to insure that the advertising would promote the general welfare of the
city. In summary, while the court has recognized a wide range of govern-
ment functions and approved activities pursuant thereto as being for a
public purpose, ithas exerted restraint on intrusions into the private sphere
to compete with or to aid particular business ventures.
This reluctance to intrude into the private sector is reflected in
Mitchell v. North Carolina Industrial Development Financing Authority,26
relied upon by the plaintiff in Martin. The plaintiff in Mitchell had sued
to enjoin the expenditure of .the tax funds allocated to the Authority.
Asserting that "for a uie to be public . . . the ultimate net gain or ad-
tantage must be the public's as contradistinguished from that of an
0 Morgan v. Town of Spindale, 254 N.C. 304, 118 S.E.2d 913 (1961).
" Keeter v. Town of Lake Lure, ?64 N.C. 252, 141 S.E.2d- 634 (1965). The
acquisition of the property was to preserve the existence of a town that was de-
pendent upon the tourist trade attracted to the lake.
22 State Educ. Assistance Auth. v. Bank of Statesville, 276 N.C. 576, 174 S.E.2d
551 (1970).
" 227 N.C. 283, 289-90, 42 S.E.2d 209, 214 (1947.).
" Ketchie v. Hedrick, 186 N.C. 392, 119 S.E. 767 (1923).
" Dennis v. City of Raleigh, 253 N.C. 400, 116 S.E.2d 923 (1960).
2. 273 N.C. 137, 159 S.E.2d 745 (1968). The Authority was established to
promote industry, increase employment, and advance the economy by providing
facilities for private operators for industrial and research pursuits. Revenue bonds
were to be issued for particular projects and the constructed facilities were then
leased to private interests. Id. at 138-39, 159 S.E.2d at 746-47.
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individual or private entity,""7 and citing Nash for the proposition that
it is not the function of government to engage in private business, the court
in Mitchell held that the function of the Authority-acquiring sites and
equipping facilities for private industry-was not a public purpose.2 8
The scope of governmental function found in public purpose has its
counterpart in the public-use requirement for the exercise of the power
of eminent domain. In Mitchell the court acknowledged that "'[f]or
the most part the term "public purpose" is employed in the same sense in
the law of taxation and in the law of eminent domain.' "20 This view
comes in the context of two basic meanings ascribed to public use: public
employment and public advantage. While the traditional meaning of
public use has been "use by the public," the trend, as reflected in the dic-
tum in Mitchell, has been toward a liberalized view embracing "advantage
to the public."8 For example, the court has upheld a condemnation pro-
ceeding for an access road to a large private business on the basis that the
road would be used by a substantial number of people to reach their place
of work or to transact business."1 One comment writer suggests that
this holding emphasized the "public benefit" test of public use for eminent
domain. 2
Since a public "purpose" for eminent domain is generally one for
which taxes may also be levied, 3 the activities of the Housing Corpora-
tion in Martin may profitably be compared with those of housing author-
ities and redevelopment commissions whose exercise of the power of
eminent domain has been sustained. In these areas, however, the govern-
ment exercise of eminent domain power is affected by the scope of its
27 273 N.C. at 144, 159 S.E.2d at 750.
,8Id. at 159, 159 S.E.2d at 761. Contra, Albritton v. City of Winona, 181 Miss.
75, 178 So. 799 (1938), noted in 20 VAND. L. Rnv. 685 (1967). Here the plain-
tiff taxpayer objected to the issue of bonds and the levy of a tax approved by the
voters of the city for the acquisition of land and construction of plants to be leased
to new industries. The court held that the authorizing statute sought to promote the
public welfare since its aims were to create jobs, to process natural resources, and
to promote agriculture.
20273 N.C. at 158, 159 S.E.2d at 760, quoting 1 CooLEY, THE LAW oF TAXATION§ 176 (4th ed. C. Nichols 1924). See also 51 Am. JUR. Taxation § 324 (1944).
" Comment, Eminent Domain--The Meaning of the Term "Public Use"--Its
Effect on Excess Condemnation, 18 MERCER L. REv. 274, 275 (1966). See also
Note, "Public Use" as a Limitation on the Exercise of Eminent Domain Power by
Private Entities, 50 IowA L. Iv. 799, 810-12 (1965).
" State Highway Comm'n v. Thornton, 271 N.C. 227, 243-45, 156 S.E.2d 248,
260-61 (1967).
" Comment, The Public Use Doctrine: "Advance Requiem" Revisited, 1969 LAW
& Soc. ORDER 688, 694-95.
" Note, 25 N.C.L. Rnv., supra note 18, at 507.
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police power. 4 This is seen in Berman v. Parker,"5 which has been viewed
by some authorities as a "fundamental pronouncement [by the United
States Supreme Court] of the merger of the police power and eminent
domain into a single legal entity .. ."36 In Berman the plaintiff sought
to enjoin the condemnation of his property under the District of Columbia
Redevelopment Act. The Court noted a Congressional finding that the
ends sought-the elimination of conditions injurious to the public health,
safety, morals, and welfare-could not be obtained by ordinary private
operations alone but also required public participation, 7 and it concluded
that the power of eminent domain was simply a means to the end which
was for "Congress alone to determine, once the public purpose has been
established.""8 The Court further declined to restrict to public ownership
the methods of attaining the public purpose of community development
projects:39
The determination of public purpose by the court in Martin arose in
the context of its earlier decisions regarding the exercise of eminent
domain to improve housing and to redevelop cities. In Wells v. Houing
Authority,4" the court appears to have anticipated the Berman merger
of the police and eminent domain powers in upholding the public purpose
of the Housing Authorities Act to accomplish "slum clearance." This was
based on the function of government to promote the health, safety, and
morals of its citizens and the execution of this function by the elimination
of conditions conducive to disease and disorder. In Martia the court
looked also to Redevelopment Commission v. Security National Bank,
41
which upheld the condemnation of land pursuant to a redevelopment plan
to eradicate "blighted areas." The definition of governmental function
in the exercise of the merged eminent domain and police powers serves as
"The North Carolina Supreme Court has recognized the scope of the police
power to embrace the protection of the public health, safety, morals, and general
welfare. E.g., S.S. Kresge Co. v. Tomlinson, 275 N.C. 1, 165 S.E.2d 236 (1969);
Town of Wake Forest v. Medlin, 199 N.C. 83, 154 S.E. 29 (1930).
"348 U.S. 26 (1954).
06 Gormley, Urban Redevelopment to Further Aesthetic Considerations: The
Changing Constitutional Concepts of Police Power and Eminent Domain, 41 N.D.L.
Rv. 316, 317 (1965).
a7 348 U.S. at 29.
"Id. at 33.
"Id. at 35.
40213 N.C. 744, 197 S.E. 693 (1938); accord, Cox v. City of Kinston, 217
N.C. 391, 8 S.E.2d 252 (1940). Mallard v. Housing Auth., 221 N.C. 334, 20 S.E.2d
281 (1942), reaffirmed the finding of a governmental function under the police
power in the elimination of unsanitary dwellings.
"252 N.C. 595, 114 S.E.2d 688 (1960).
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a guide for the definition of governmental function for the exercise of
the taxing power in Martin since "[w]hatever is necessary for the pres-
ervation of the public health and public safety is a public purpose for which
taxes may be collected." '42  . .
Having recognized the interrelationship of the powers 'of police, em-
inent domain and taxation, the court in Martin was still faced with the
task of determining whether the activities of the Housing Corporation
were pursuant to a proper governmental function for which the taxing
power could be exercised. The two cases cited by the court had involved
the physical elimination of poor housing. The public purpose in Wells was
"slum clearance,"4 while the public purpose in Security National Bank
was'the eradication of "blighted areas."4 However, in Martin the object
was to remedy the shortage of decent, low-cost housing by fostering the
construction and financing of modest housing not otherwise available."
The" court in Mitchell had not found a public purpose in the Authority's
function of constructing and equipping facilities for private industry.40
The dissent in Martin47 considered the purpose of the Housing Corpora-
tion-assisting individuals in acquiring housing-distinguishable from
the more direct elimination of a menace to the public health and safety in
Wells and Security National Bank and indistinguishable from aiding
individuals in housing busin.esses, which Was not sustained by the court
in Mitchell. The majority in Martin, however, distinguished Mitchell as
involving the subsidizing of "particular private industries which were in
competition with other unsubsidized industries."4 Thus the presence of
a governmental function in Martin appears to turn in part on the way the
purpose of the activity is described49 and the directness of its relation to
the elimination of inadequate housing, which would be a proper exercise
of the police power."0
However, there is an additiofial element by which these cases can be
42 51 Am. JUR. Taxation § 328 (1944).
48 213 N.C. at 747, 197 S.E.2d at 695.
"252 N.C. at 604, 114 S.E.2d at 695.
" 277 N.C. at 48, 175 S.E.2d at 676.
"273 N.C. at 159, 159 S.E.2d at 761.
47 277 N.C. at 60-63, 175 S.E.2d at 683-85.
,
8 id. at 50, 175 S.E.2d at 677.
The majority view of eliminating the shortage of adequate housing is set
against the dissenting view of aiding individuals.
so The majority view of attacking the shortage of adequate housing by fostering
the planning, construction, and financing of low-cost housing is set against the
dissenting view of inadequately relating the activities of the Housing Corporation
to the elimination of slums.
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recornciled. In each the court deals with the question of the proper role
of government in relation to a private economy. How are the two to func-
tion in meeting particular problems? When is government intruding too
far and threatening private capitalism?. When is some degree of in-
trusion ever justified? It has been' suggested that the term "public pur-
pose" simply distinguishes -those things for which the government is to
provide'from those to be left to private support. The determination of what
is public or private frequently is a matter of policy and- wisdom decided
in light of the public welfare.51 Concern for the relation of governmental
and private activity is seen in Mitchell,5 where the couit cited Nash for
the proposition that it is not the function of government to engage in
private business. The court also noted the observation in Wells that the
existence of slums shows the impotency or ,unwillingness of private enter.:
prise to deal with the problem, thus impelling government to act where
community initiative has failed. The opinion likewise addresses the concern
with private activity by explicit reference to the legislative finding of the
inability of unassisted private enterprise to meet th& need for low-cost,
safe, and sanitary housing.53 Thus the finding of a governmental function
in Martin appears to be based in part on the noninterference with the
private sector by the activities of the Housing Corporation.
The concern of the dissent for the benefit accruing to the individual
homeowners resolves itself in large measure in how the activities of the
Housing Corporation are described. If taken to be for the purpose of
eliminating the shortage of adequate housing and thus promoting the
public health, safety, morals, and welfare, the activity should be sustained.
The court has held in State Education Assistance Authority v. Bank of
Statesville4 that "the fact that the individual obtains a private benefit can-
not be considered sufficient ground to defeat the execution of 'a paramount
public purpose.'" The activities of the Housing Corporation would cer-
tainly inure to the benefit of individuals, while achieving the public pur-
pose of fostering the construction of adequate housing. Individuals also
51 51 Am. JuR. Taxation § 326 (1944). See also Note, "Public Use" as a Limr-
itation on the Exercise of the Eminent Domain Power by Private Entities, 50 Iowa
L. RE V. 799, 815 (1965); Note, Industrial Revenue Bonds, 4 WILLIAMETTE L.J.
517, 521 (1967).
"= 273 N.C. at 156-58, 159 S.E.2d at 758-59'
11 277 N.C. at 49, 175 S.E.2d at 676. The court also quotes from the Act passages
indicating that many of the loans to be made by the Housing Corporation were
to be made only upon the determination that they were not otherwise available from
private lenders on reasonably equivalent terms.
'276 N.C. 576, 588, 174 S.E.2d 551, 560 (1970).
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benefit when a housing authority eliminates a slum, but this activity has
been considered a public purpose in North Carolina since Wells was de-
cided in 1938.
The dissent's concern with the indirectness of the efforts of the
Housing Corporation in eliminating inadequate housing is likewise an-
swered in part by the existing case law. The court has upheld the dis-
cretion of housing authorities in locating their projects on sites not
presently in a slum area.55 Thus the court has not insisted in every in-
stance on the most direct attack on the slum to sustain a finding of public
purpose. This view is consistent with the development of the law follow-
ing Berman whereby "[h]ousing projects for persons of low income
alone, without provisions for slum clearance, became objects for which the
power of eminent domain could be exercised."5 6 In Martin the court found
sufficient nexus between the activities of the Housing Corporation and the
elimination of the shortage of low cost housing, and such minimal in-
trusion into the private arena that the activities could be sustained as
pursuant to a proper governmental function and thus for a public purpose.
In so holding the court acted in the context of existing case law without
overruling Mitchell, which can be seen as blocking deep-seated involve-
ment in the affairs of private enterprise. Nevertheless, the analytical tools
of Martin afford the means to modify the Mitchell result should the pur-
pose sought be of sufficient social importance, the means chosen sufficiently
direct, and the degree of intrusion into the private sphere sufficiently cir-
cumscribed.
KENNETH C. DAY
Personal Jurisdiction-Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporation Based
Upon Maling a Contract in North Carolina
Courts can obtain personal jurisdiction over nonregistered foreign
corporations by the use of long-arm statutes.' International Shoe Co. v.
"E.g., Housing Auth. v. Wooten, 257 N.C. 358, 126 S.E.2d 101 (1962); In re
Housing Authority, 233 N.C. 649, 65 S.E.2d 761 (1951).
" Comment, 1969 LAw & Soc. OnDER, supra note 32, at 697.
'For a brief review of the development of the long-arm statute, see McGee v.
International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). The important thing to re-
member about long-arm statutes is that the mere ability to fit a situation within a
statute's language does not mean that jurisdiction will always be proper. The ulti-
mate test is the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment-not the wording of
the long-arm statute. Id. at 222.
[Vol. 49
